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Ce sujet de recherche propose une défense du contractualisme
philosophique. Le contractualisme est une variation plus précise du
contrat sociale habituelle. Mon projet défend une nouvelle variation
de ce contrat, le contractualisme de T. M. Scanlon. Ce nouveau
contrat utilise la théorie de Scanlon comme base pour élucider la
genèse et la nature des normes qui conduise nos comportements
sociaux et variables.
This thesis proposes a defense of philosophical contractualism.
Contractualism is a more precise variation on the familiar social
contract tradition. My thesis defends a new version of this contract
position, ‘Scanlonian’ contractualism. This new contract is
‘Scanlonian’ to the extent that it employs the resources of T. M.
Scanlon’s view as a base from which to elucidate the nature and
origins of social norms, viewing these as both determinants and
variables affecting social behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis offers a critical assessment of T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism.
It interprets contractuaiism as a two-level theory divided between normative
and methodological concerns. The first level is the theor/s normative level. It
defends “mutual recognitiod’ and “fairnes’ as the key normative notions that any
moral theory must defend in order to be coherent. To negate these values in
dealing with others is for Scanlon the essence of the commission of moral
wrong. This minimal view of what rnorality requires (mutual recognition plus
fairness) is buftressed by methodological minimalism at the second level. The
methodology for distinguishing moral riglit from wrong lies in establishing two
further criteria. First, what specific reasons is the person appealing to? Second,
in what context does she appeal to these? These two questions concern the
particular link Scanlon forges between formai and substantive forms of
justification in ethics. This linkage figures prominently in what foilows. The
above structure is the essence of “contractualisn’ and is detailed most fully in
Scanlons What We Owe to Each Other (2000).
The thesis wili argue that contractuaiism shouid be viewed primarily as
an account of moral motivation, secondarily as an account of moral wrong, and
thirdly an interpersonal account of the requirements of fairness, in that order.
Mi three aspects of the theory are in turn instances of a wider category, that of
practical reason. That is, each of the three aspects concern what it is most
relevant to deliberate about when deliberating ethically on how to act.
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Contractualism, by Scanlon’s own admission, does flot offer
comprehensive answers to the questions above. Instead it prefers to offer robust
guidelines on how one can corne to deliberate about these issues for themselves.
I view this personal and practical element of the theory as its novelty. I consider
Scanlon’s contractualisrn a practical exercise, in that it aims to improve our
existing understanding of our entrenched moral and deliberative practices. The
issue for Scanlon is flot that of providing first principles. It is rather the yeoman’s
task of looking at moral practice as it is and of attempting to formulate rules and
guides for making it more consistent and hence fairer in the end. It also
addresses and takes seriously the daims of moral pluralism. For part of fairness
is inclusion. To this end, contractualisrn is eminently practical. The influence of
pluralism informs later parts ofthe thesis.
Contractualism introduces several irnprovements to standard theories of
moral motivation. These seek to provide psychological explanations for the
adherence moral agents exhibit toward mores and rules of conduct.
Contractualism attempts to extrapolate an account of moral motivation working
from the ground up. Instead of constructing a formai account of moral
motivation, Scanlon takes as a fact that individuals are actually motivated to act
on moral grounds. This assumption is held on empirical grounds and stands in
contraposition to other purely formai theories.
His daim is not however that everyone already acts as they should. It is
rather the daim that we do sometimes act according to proper moral reasons.
And it is occurrences of proper moral reasoning that interest him.
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A formai view would not take the actual (substantive) values that underpin the
deliberative process into account. Scanlon’s view does. For contractualism, our
substantive values mallers as much as our purely logical reasons do, for the two
work in concert. Deliberation on the contractualist view, briefly put, amounts to
coordination between values and procedures.
In contrast, the practical task for ideal theory would be to show that it
accords witli embedded moral life. For without this connection, ideal theoiy
remains motivationally inert. Its moral “ouglit tu’ would have no force. The
practical task for contractualism is to show that it is capable of criticizing the
established moral norms and habits that it takes as its ground. Starting with
what we actually do, contractualism lias the advantage of already being in accord
with (sorne) of our moral practices.
As Scanlon aims at providing a principled account of moral motivation
and not of providing an endorsement for the status quo, he takes the notion of a
‘asoii”to be both primitive, in that it is flot analyzable, and central, in that value
ïs only attributable to agents via recourse to reasons. Only agents act and only
agents attribute values. Any theory failing to do justice to this insight is for this a
practicai failure. ‘The idea of a reason should be taken as the central notion for
understanding desire, motivation, value, and moralit’ (Scanlon 159 2003). In
attempting to align moral practice and moral motivation, contractualism lias
done something uncommon.
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It has created a hybrid between a formai, and hence procedural, account of
moral motivation and a substantive account of it. Scanlon’s hybrid, like bis whole
project, is an outgrowh of bis view of bis main problem.
The goal Scanlon wants to reach is that of erecting an ethic that is at once
perspicuous and practicabie. He views the obstacles to his success thusly. “Any
explanation of how something can count in favor of something else either
explains this in normative terms, in which case it may be convincing but does
flot explain reasons in general, or else offers a psychological explanation, in
which case the normative force of reasons is not convincingly explained. Faced
with this dilemma, I am inclined to think that our inability to explain how
something could be a reason is flot due to a weakness in our phulosophical
resources but rather to the fact that the relation of being a reason for is too
fundamental to be helpfuliy explained in other term’ (Scanlon 177 2003). Three
aspects make up this original set of problems. First, to “explain something in
normative term’ is to offer a value judgment. As Scanlon notes, depending on
the deliberative context, such a move may (or may not) be persuasive. Yet the
core problem for contractualism remains. The offering of value (of substantive
moral reasons) does nothing to illuminate the origin of those values. What
deliberative process led one to endorse the particular values in question? The
substantivist perspective is no help in answering this question. Second, the offer
of”psychological explanation,”typically on the order of Humean appeals to desire,
lias the opposite effect to that of appealing to values. Norms disappear.
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In appealing to purely psychological explanations (to mostly formalistic
procedures), the normative force behind moral actions fails ont of the equation.
To illustrate this, consider that in acting as I do, I do not flrst appeal to my
desires in order to know how to act. I have those desires in virtue of the
consequences and in virtue of the allributes of the states of affairs that my
actions bring into being. I desire an object, for example, not because I desire it,
but because of its exhibition of desirable properties. Placing desires at the center
of psychological explanation is, from a contractualist viewpoint, wrongheaded.
Reasons function in the other direction. I have reason to desire an object, in
virtue of its allributes, so I do desire it. Desire does not arise in a vacuum
anymore than reason alone could push or motivate us to act.
Accounts of the requirements of morality, often assume this
psychologistic (procedural) form. A classical formulation of such a motivational
requirement is found in Kant. For Kant, our reasons and our motivations are in
lockstep. To be motivated to act against the dictates of reason is to 5e both
irrational and morally corrupt. On Kant’s top down view, we want what it is
rational for us to want. Anything short of this pulls rationality and morality
apart. The idea is that they are in some sense unitary. The social contract
tradition that motivates Scanlon’s own attempt is suffused with attempts to
reconcile disparate elements of moral theory. Kant self-consciously attempts
such reconciliation in his own philosophy. Kant wants to conjoin the “unity of
reasori”with the”primacy of practic’much in the way Scanlon does.
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It is therefore worth examining what Kant, who along with Rousseau influences
Scanlon, says about this relation.
This [attempt] involves the questions of 1mw the theoretical point of view and the
practical point of view fit together and how legitimate daims of each form of reason are
adjusted in a reasonable (and of course consistent) way. Kant believes that at bottom
there is only one reason, which issues into different ideas and principles according to its
application: whether to the knowledge of given objects or to the production of objects
according to a conception of those objects. This is his doctrine of the unity of reason. An
aspect ofthis unity is the primacy ofthe practical: the discussion ofthis leads to the idea
ofphilosophy as defense (Groundwork Pref: 11 [391] Rawls 16 2000).
Scanlon’s project is similar in many regards thought it is less ambitious than
Kant’s is. k is also uncommitted to the controversial doctrines Kant endorses.
Scanlon calls this inchoate relation between normativity and rationality into
question. While he agrees with Kant that reasons and rules influence each other,
in ethics, as well as elsewhere, Scanlon does not believe that morality and
rationality are interchangeable. Immorality for a contractualist is not
irrationality, nor is the opposite true. There are occasions were acting against
our desires is a perfectly rational thing to do. If I override my desires to act a
certain way, and I do this because of good reasons, I am being responsible. The
idea with a procedural account of motivation is to show that rationality requires
a certain type of (responsible) conduct. Such conduct is rendered impossible by
the desires-first view. ‘Attempts to explain how the fact an action is wrong
provides a reason not to do it face a difficult dilemma. Understood in one way,
the answer is obvious: the reason not to do the action is just that it is wrong. But
this is surely not the kind of answer that is wanted: it simply takes the reason
giving force of moral considerations for granted’ (Scanlon 149 2000).
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Proceduralism faces the second horn of the dilemma. Substantivism for
its part must deal with the flrst. It takes views wrong actions as prima facie
wrong and therefore takes “their reason-giving forcd’ for granted. In Kanfs
verbiage, utilitarianism and other forms of pure substantivism, fail because
‘4uHlitarians maintain that the principle of utility, by taking evelyone’s desires and
inclinations into account on an impartial basis, treats everyone as ends-in
themselves and neyer as means only.
To treat persons as means only, they say, is to disregard their desires and
inclinations, or not to give them an appropriate weight. . for by viewing people as
subjects of desires and inclinations and assigning value to their satisfactions as
such, (classical utilitarianism is at odds with [proceduralist] doctrine at a
fundamental level’ (Rawls 19$ 2000 [Brackets mine.]). Scanlon hopes that by
mixing the substantivism and proceduralism a comprehensive picture of moral
deliberation will emerge, one that avoids both pitfalls. Now that we have seen
the failing of substantivism, let us consider a benefit of affirming this view.
Substantivism “explains the reason-giving force of moral judgments by
characterizing more fully, in substantive terms, the particular form of value that
we respond to in acting rightly and violate in by doing what is wrong’ (Scanlon
150 2000). Another example of a substantivist view is hedonistic utilitarianism.
H focuses solely on substantive values (in the hedonistic case, happiness and the
avoidance of pain) as individuals experience these. Therefore, both
proceduralism and substantivism have something to recommend them. Yet as
Scanlon points out, both also have blind spots.
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Further, contractualism daims that ail monistic theories are prone to this
undue partiality, not just those that subscribe to substantivist or proceduraiist
tenets. In focusing too closeiy on their favored criterion, “dut3J’ frn the case of
deontology and “experienc’ in the case of utilitarianism, monist theories distort
the practice of actual moral deliberation and this in undesirable ways.
Inaccurate representations of these fundamental practical components wiil lead
to inaccurate theories, Scanlon fears. In the end, contractualism seeks to
overcome the aspect blindness that afflicts these and other prominent ethical
theories by making place for genuine piuralism. The idea here, as in Kant, is to
accommodate different standards at different times. Rightness and wrongness,
for Scanion, cannot be reduced to the formai criteria (or procedures) endorsed
by a moral agent or group any more than the substantive values of a given
community or individual. Yet his is not a relative doctrine either. He terms his
view “parametric universalisn’ (Scanlon 339-341 2000). He explains its
barebones this way. “Ail that that doctrine requires is that if we daim that X is a
reason for one of these people to do A, but not for the other, then we are
committed to the daim that there is some relevant dzfference between their
situation’ (Scanlon 178 2003 [Itaiics mine]). This “parametrid’ element in
Scanlon’s universalism opens a space for a principled endorsement of pluralism.
Rather than adopting an “anything goe’ attitude, Scanlon is commilled to
articulating a procedure for differentiating between morally relevant situations.
Despite their failings, proceduralist and substantivist positions point out salient
features of moral life.
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Reliabie procedures, for exampie, are required if we are to criticize our
actions and the actions of others as we corne to create societal rules of conduct.
Yet to some ethicists, these procedurai/substantivist rnoves are ail that rnoraiity
requires. To others however, this is but the beginning. Scanion is the second
type of ethicist. For him, a true moral dilemma confounds our best rules about
how to act. It is the ail too comrnon disjunction, between prescription and action
that motivates Scanion to tiy to formuiate new normative guidelines. These new
guideline seek to spiit the difference between action and prescription.
Parametric universaiism atternpts to spiice the benefits of proceduralism
together with those of substantivisrn. Above we saw the procedural element. I
now turn to the substantivist eiement.
“fus [i.e., parametric universalism] is [also] a substantive daim about
reasons, which is likeiy to be more plausible for some values of’X and ‘A than for
others. When one is choosing among two activities, each of which is worthwhiie,
the fact that one is”drawn td’one ofthese, but flot the other, can be a good reason
for pursuing it, because it indicates, for exampie, that one wiil be happier, or
more likely to be successful in that pursuit. In other cases, however, it may be
rnuch less plausible to daim that the reasons a person lias depend on how these
considerations strike hirn or liei’ (Scanion 178 2003 [Brackets mine]). So the
central daim of this thesis is sustained by the fact that Scanlon hirnself grounds
contractualism in wiliingness to do conceptual justice to eveiyday moral
experience.
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- As Scanion puts it, “the idea that an action is of a kind that there is reason
to have discouraged is sureiy not unreiated to the idea of its being wrong’
(Scanion 2001 153). He goes on to write that for contractuaiism”ffie challenge is
to formulate this [above] relation correctiy and to speil out how believing an act
to be wrong is connected to seeing a reason not to perform if’ (Scanion 2000 153
[Brackets mine]). Scanion then rounds-out bis account ofthe difference between
formai and substantive views of moral motivation by saying that ‘What we need
to do, then, is to expiain more ciearly how the idea than an act is wrong flows
from the idea that there is an objection of a certain kind to peopie’s being
aliowed to perform such actions, and we need to do this in a way that makes
clear how an act’s being wrong in the sense described can provide a reason flot to
do if’(Scanion 2000 153).
On Scanion’s view, contractualism targets two goals vis-à-vis these
concerns. The first goal is to criticize our moral practices on their own terms.
The second goal is to expiain moral wrong as a failure to act or to offer others
reasons for our actions that they couid not reasonably reject. Notice that both of
these requirements target actual (and therefore practical) improvements,
improvements in which practices we practice, which reasons we offer others,
and what criteria we employ in deliberating about those same reasons.
The burden contractualism must meet, is that of expiaining why we are
generaily motivated to abide by various norms in the flrst place. It must do this
while offering an explanation of our norms that is recognizable in their own
terms.
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In short, contractuaiism wants to provide an independent standard with which
to criticize and revise presently held norms. Nevertheless, it wishes to do this
without distorting the norms or the practices that constitute its subject maller.
Yet one may stili wonder what”practica1it’has to do with ail this. Over and above
the welcome (practical) influence that reflective reason-giving has over
unreflective reason-giving, another element motivates Scanlon’s account.
Scanlon endorses contractualism in part because he takes moral pluralism, the
distinctive mark of contemporary moral communities, seriously.
Taking pluralism seriously involves developing and endorsing a moral
theory capable of bridging the gap between contradictory (normative)
viewpoints while considering each side’s respective concerns. Many debates
concerning the role of religion in the public sphere take on this pluralistic
character. And this taking of accounts, is precisely what contractualism does.
Therefore, I think for the above reasons that it is fair to characterize the
Scanlonian project as essentially an exercise in practical ethics.
Scanlon wants to address pluralism because failure to do so resuits
primarily in actual (and not only conceptual) discord. While the thesis focuses
primarily on Scanlon’s methodology in what follows, it is the interplay between
the various constitutive elements of contractualism that interests me. The chief
relation characterizing these constitutive elements is a dual commitment on
Scanlon’s part; a commitment that echoes previously visited themes.
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Mirroring its extra-methodological commitments, contractualism
entertains two principal methodological commitments: the flrst is to
proceduralism, the second is to substantivism. Several commentators have
identffied this two-part commitment, most notably Mfred R. Mele, Piers
Rawling, Brad Hooker, and Bart Streumer. Yet Scanlon’s attempt to
accommodate pluralism, as well as the broader drive to establish a practicable
ethic, goes largely unnoticed, even among these largely sympathetic
commentators. My explication of Scanlon’s project aims to correct this.
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CHAPTER 1
The present interpretation of Scanlonian contractualism is defended via
three avenues. I examine the roots of the social contract tradition that inspires
contractualism. I also explicate the salient features of contractualism’s structure.
Finally, I assess the view against critiques made of it. By way of a conclusion, the
thesis ends with a brief summary of contractualism’s future fortunes as I see
these. In the end, I judge the project to be incomplete in certain ways,
misunderstood in others, and plausible overali. Its final plausibility turns out to
be grounded in its pragmatic conception of moral motivation. I now continue
frame working the central aspects in Scanlon’s view. The excursus below leads to
a broader consideration of the social contract tradition. Reasons play a key role
in both the history and the development of contractualist ethics, as this chapter
will make plain. Reasons are a core theme in Scanlon’s overall project. Reasons
are so fundamental to the contractualist project that Scanlon takes the role of
acting as a reason within deliberation, whether pro or con, to be analytically
primitive. By this, he means that reasons, unlike other objects of thought,
cannot be broken down into elements that are more basic. So the project of
constructing an ethic with reason at its center, a project synonymous with
contractualism itself, cannot be properly understood unless the counterbalance
between substantive values and abstract procedures are antecedently
understood. The reason for this is that Scanlon’s conception of reason is part of
his conception of the formai and substantive elements underlying moral
motivation.
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Reasons play into Scanlon’s commitment to proceduralism about matters
of practical rationality as well as playing into his cornmitment to substantivism
about practical reason. $canlon’s thesis about moral deliberation is holist in
nature. Scanlon’s characterization of rnoral deliberation rests entirely upon the
interplay between substantivism and proceduralism, which in turn informs bis
view on moral motivation. Additionally, the practical aspects of bis project corne
forward only once the above elernents are seen in their proper conceptual space.
Mele and Rawling illustrate the relevant “conceptual spacd’ well. They describe
Scanlon’s outlook thusly. “According to proceduralism an agent is open to
rational criticism for lacking a desire only if she fails to have a desire that she
can rationally reach from her beliefs and other desires, whereas according to
substantivism an agent is open to such criticism flot only if her desires fail
procedurally, but also if they fail substantively-bere, for example, an agent who
lacks the desire to take curative medicine might be substantively irrational in
virtue of this lack, and yet be procedurally rational because she cannot rationally
reach this desire from her beliefs and other desire’ (Mele and Rawling 2004 6
[Original italics]). The balance of procedural concerns and substantive moral
concerns open a space for appreciating a distinct kind of pluralism and one that
interests Scanlon deeply.
For contractualism, every concrete act of valuing some state, some
person, or some act, brings in its stead a distinct method of appraisal. Stated
differently, every valuing (potentially) bas its own metric associated with it.
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Therefore, something of cultural or historical value (an artifact perhaps) will
have a different standard of value than something idiosyncratic ta favored sports
jersey). Yet both the jersey and the artifact have things in common. The jersey is
itself an artifact. Moreover, sports competitions are flot generally idiosyncratic
pursuits. Stili, the way we value an ancient vase and the way we value something
of emotional value. What accounts for the difference? It is here that Scanlon’s
theory becomes plausible in a way unthought-of by bis critics.
By looking at how people actually value the things they value, we get a
beller grip on what the reasoning behind some of their appraisals is. Those
appraisals in turn speak not only to the object appraised (the jersey or the vase)
but also to the motivations and beliefs of the appraiser. One may judge the vase
differently if one thinks it is an original 1364 Ming vase rather than a 1644 Ming
reproduction. What makes Scanlon’s contractualism “practical’ is bis realization
that these subtie shifts in evaluation and motivation matter to moral theory.
Moreover, he attempts to explain these shifts where others paper over them.
Contractualism echoes themes from the social contract tradition. One of
contractualism’s prime themes is the idea that in ethics the interests of
individuals matter and that these malter equally.
Just how these interests are to be spelled-out and how “equalit3P is to be
deflned remain a point of contention within the tradition itself. Historically, the
social contract tradition has stood at odds to other moral traditions. Older, more
conservative, theories place established tradition, obedience to god, or other
similar notions, at the center of morality.
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This is obviously so in the case of medieval and Catholic morality. The later
contractarian tradition in contrast, takes the relation of man to society as its
respective starting point. I refer to non-Scanlonian contract theorists as
1zontractarians’ This is to avoid potential confusion. “Contractualisni’ is the
favored term for Scanlon’s view.
Most traditional contractarians see the role of moral theory as that of
mediator. The task on this conception is therefore to reconcile self-interest with
group-interest. The trick is to do it without depriving either of its rightful place
in moral deliberation. In contrast to the historical background, Scanlon’s account
is an attempt to bring methodological precision to the aims of the older
contractarians. Another point of reference between Scanlon’s theory and the
views of older contract theorists is his acknowledgment of the importance of
mutual recognition and reason. It is not enough for parties to the contract to
admit that each lias their respective interests. These said interests must be taken
seriously within the deliberative framework itself.
Wliolesale recognition of another part3/s position requires a commitment
to taking on some of that part)/s values and perspectives. This is why one of
Scanlon’s tests of whether a given action is acceptable or not is “reasonable
rejectability’ Scanlon’s contractualism is a teclinically demanding philosophical
doctrine, its component notions of mutual recognition and reasonable
rejectabffity are grounded in the phenomenology of moral life. Nevertlieless,
there are problems with the coherence of lis account which we return to in the
final parts ofthe thesis.
While a “practical out1ool’ animates the whole of Scanlonian
contractualism, certain problems arise that I find insurmountable for him at
present. In the end, $canlon’s is a mixed theoretical bag. Stated simply, I think
the practical dimension of Scanlon’s work deserves more attention than it
typically receives. To this end, the thesis examines contractualism’s practical side
and attempts to show that it is indispensable to the theory overail. With some
alterations, the practical aspects can one day corne to full fruition. To explain the
theory it needs to be placed it in its proper historical context; I therefore try to
lay out the main features and cornmitrnents of Scanlon’s contractualisrn in this
first chapter.
This allows subsequent sections to flesh out subordinate features of lis
theory. They will highuight its strong points and (later) flag places where 1 think
Scanlon may have gone astray of creating a fully practicable ethic. Once I
properly explain the theoiy, I try to defend the warrant of rny practical
appreciation of it. Thankftilly, the practical viewpoint has the benefit of
underscoring the continuity between Scanlon’s project and that of older social
contractarians rather than of blurring it. “Contractarianisrn names both a
political theory of the legitirnacy of political authority and a moral theory about
the origin and/or legitimate content of moral norms. The political theory of
authority daims that legitimate authority of government must derive from the
consent of the governed, where the form and content of this consent derives
from the idea of contract or mutual agreement.
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The moral theory of contractarianism daims that moral norms derive their
normative force from the idea of contract or mutual agreement. Contractarians
are thus skeptical of the possibility of grounding moralitv or political authority
in either divine will or some perfectionist ideal of the nature of humanitP (Cudd
2003). And it is these doctrinal differences that separate pre-l7th centuiy ethics
from post-l7th century contractarianism. Contractarians such as Kant and
Thomas Hobbes also souglit to connect their theories to the practical in ethics
and politics. This means that Hobbes and Kant saw their respective social
contracts as practical devices for inaugurating understanding and (indirect)
political change. For Hobbes, “ail persons have the private or personal end of
their own happiness, or of their own security. These ends are, of course, not
shared; they may be of the same kind, yet they are not the very same end.
Hobbes’s social contract establishing the sovereign does not involve a shared
end, much less an end that everyone ought to share, except insofar as they are
rational (as opposed to reasonable). Moreover, the stats institutions are a
common end only in the sense that they are a means to each individual’s
separate happiness or sedurity. Those institutions do flot specify a form of public
political life that is to be seen by citizens as right or just in itself and from which
they are moved by their sense of justice to act. The society of Leviathun is a kind
of pi’ivate societP (Rawls 365 2000 [Original italics]). The classical
contractarians did not intend their theories to function solely as hypothetical
interventions. Kant for one, whose views differ markedly from Hobbes on this
score, saw the relation in more social, less atomistic terms.
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Kant “supposes that ail citizens understand the social contract as an idea
of reason, with its obligatory shared end that they politically establish a social
union. On his doctrine, citizens have to have the very same end of securing for
other citizens, as well as for themselves, their basic constitutional rights, and
liberties. Moreover, this shared end is characterized by reasonable principles of
right and justice; it is a form of political life that is reasonable and fair (Rawls
365 2003 [Original italics])’They also believed that once the theory allowed for
everyone’s interests, adherence to it wouid reduce disputes between citizens. A
proper accounting would arise out of a cost-beneflt analysis of cadi contracting
person’s needs and interests.
The contract device in Hobbes and Kant therefore acts as a filter of sorts.
It filters out idiosyncratic individual wants and needs. It replaces these with
public and consensus-driven values that are also acceptable on an individual
level. Social contract theorists think that consensus contributes to the peace,
stability, and wefl-being of ail impiicated citizens and contractors. These are
bridge-areas between ethics and politics. Traditional contractarians saw
themselves as providing an account of the nature of our moral norms. This
account is intended to one both of their origins and of their potential (morai)
justifications. Therefore, for Kant and Hobbes, the practicability of moraiity
relies on the possibility of forging (actuai) wide speared social cooperation. It is
the grounding of such a project that is at issue and not the viability of project
itseif.
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What is more, morality of this type relies on the transmission and
reproduction of norms (typically norms of reciprocity for a social contract
theorist) across a society. This usualiy occurs via socialization and both Hobbes
and Kant make respective mention of this in the Leviathan and in The
Groundwork. Without transmission and retransmission, social cooperation
would be a burden rather than an aid. Social practices have to be in place so that
cooperation can be effective. Despite these similarities between Kant and
Hobbes, stark differences also exist. Kant was concerned with a moral contract
predicated on seduring social justice for ail citizens and this on the shouiders of
reason.
He saw ail citizens as moral persons, born free and forced into social
cooperation by the knavish circumstances of communal life. Hobbes for his part
was concerned with the transfer of one’s natural rights to a sovereign. This was
done in exchange for peace under a social compact. Writing during civil war,
Hobbes’s views emphasize security over social justice.
While both men knew that explanatory, conceptual, and normative issues
existed concerning their respective social contracts, they were also at odds about
what to do with about these lacunas. Kant leaned in the direction of endorsing
the normative side of contracting, seeing this as the most productive option and
as the one that would stave off the ruthless self-interest often detected in
Hobbes’s account. Hobbes thought that the contract device explained away the
troublesome normative elements. for Hobbes, normativity is nothing other than
bargaining for one’s advantage and satisfying ons desires.
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As such, the normative question, of what one individual owes to another
individual, either in virwe of lis or her shared humanity or of his or lier shared
citizenship, neyer arises. In Kant, the focus on this issue is altogether different.
For Kant, the collective will and reason of each individual contractor (as
expressed through a social contract) yields better results than any individual can
attain alone in society. By “better results’ Kant intended a relaxation of
pernicious competition and a more peaceftil and productive society for ail. This
is an alternative ruled out it by Hobbes’s view of human nature.
In Hobbes, communal iife can (and often does) lead to petty
competitiveness and sometimes to disaster or death. The state of nature was
often viewed as barbarous because it is naturally bereft of morality and thought
that ah that was “good’ was the resuit of a productive socialization in which
individuals were taught to consider the wehl-being of others. Natural man on
both views is in constant competition with others, but his’wihI’is different. This is
a notion shared by both Hobbes and Kant thought their draw very different
conclusions from it.
Because security against various threats (whether they are natural or
social threats) is best established by banding together with other (similarly
situated) individuals, a contract that details permissible conduct in society is
indispensable. The social contract in question is an agreement toward equalizing
these “peak’ of cooperation while minimizing the ‘\îalley’ of discord that afflict
social life.
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Therefore, the difference between Hobbes and Kant on these questions of SoCial
justice versus individuai security hou down to the fact that for Hobbes such
contracting is ail there is to the nature of morality. We wish to diminisli discord
whule maximizing personal advantage for Hobbes and that is ail. Kant takes a
different view.
Kant’s analysis of commonsense ideas begins with the thought that the only thing good
without qualification is a ‘good will’. While the phrases ‘he’s good hearted’, ‘she’s good natured’
and ‘she means well’ are common, ‘the good will’ as Kant thinks of it is not the same as any of
these ordinaiy notions. The idea of a good will is doser to the idea of a ‘good person’, or, more
archaicafly, a ‘person of good will’. This use of the term ‘will’ early on in analyzing ordinaiy
moral thought in fact prefigures later and more technical discussions concerning the nature of
rational agency. Nevertheless, this idea of a good will is an important commonsense touchstone
to which he returns throughout his works. The basic idea is that what makes a good person good
is his possession of a will that is in a certain way ‘determined’ by, or makes its decisions on the
basis of, the moral law. The idea of a good will is supposed to be the idea of one who only makes
decisions that she holds to be morally worthy, taking moral considerations in themselves to be
conclusive reasons for guiding her behavior. This sort of disposition or character is something
we ail highly value. Kant believes we value it without limitation or qualification (Johnson 2004).
Whule the above characterization of Kant’s conception is reminiscent of Scanlon,
Hobbes does not explicitly appeal to a pacific component in human nature, save
for localized fellow-feeling and occasionai compassion. In fact, lie more often
alludes to man’s darker nature. Kant does however recognize a strong civilizing
aspect in society that Hobbes remains skeptical toward. The social contract in
Kant sets the (idealized) conditions for membership in society in a way that it
does not in Hobbes. For Hobbes fellow feeling and other non-cognitive aspects
of human psycliology do that for us. Yet despite these differences, traditional
contractarians, in the mold of Hobbes and Kant, distanced themselves from the
ancient idea that man’s nature makes him intrinsically moral. Kant and Hobbes
argue that ethics is a maller of mutual agreement between free agents.
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This freedom renders the agreement a true “contracf’ rather than being
something tradition compels man to or that nature makes him unable to resist.
These classic Hobessian and Kantian views are both deeply antiauthoritarian.
This is so particularly regarding churcli authority and forms of state authority
that denies natural talents and freedoms to individuals. Their view of such forms
of authority is extremely criticaL Individualism, unsurprisingly, looms large on
both accounts.
The psychological makeup of the individuals in Hobbes and Kanfs
accounts remains ambiguous. There are few distinct pointers as to this
psychology’s nature. Nor to a distinct and persuasive link to the form of
individualism, they both (differently) endorse. In the end, what separates
Hobbes from Kant is Hobbes’s view of moral agents as wholly self-interested.
Kant views man, as an intrinsically social creature in a way that Hobbes neyer
does. This divergence does not vitiate the fact that both phulosophers think of
morality as a predominantly social phenomenon. Each theorist uses a “state of
naturd’ argument to remove the fetters of socialization and of tradition from
their abstract conceptions of a single contractor. This abstraction from actual
social arrangements is necessary for both. Without such an abstraction,
individual contractors would simply fail back on old aflegiances (familial, tribal,
or other) or on other entrenched patters of social cooperation. What Kant and
Hobbes wanted to do was to analyze these existing patters of cooperation.
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The only way to da that with perspicuity is to allow potential contractors to
image an initial moment of founding, one in which allegiances and pacts are first
established. What people will choose is up for grabs in a thought experirnent
such as this. Because of this, Hobbes and Kant offer divergent answers. This is
unsurprising if one recails that their respective accounts of basic human
psychology are different. Kant’s account is tacit and iii explicated. Hobbes’s view,
for its part, is dire and minimal with survival taking the center stage.
One sees social cooperation as likely (Kant) while the other views it as evil
but unavoidable (Hobbes). Norms, in Hobbes, are about maximizing individual
interests. Moral agents are to navigate whatever antagonisrns arise and to
employ compromise when necessary. While allowing for the influence of fellow
feeling, overali Hobbes is less optimistic about social cooperation than is the
Kant of The Groundwork. The contract tradition that Kant influences sees the
debate over human nature differently. For Kant, and for Scanlon whorn he
explicitly inspires, the legitimacy of the social contract originates within
individuals. The contract aUains legitimacy chiefly by disciplining the
psychological and the moral motivations of social actors.
This disciplining procedure begins with the simple recognition that all
similarly situated individuals are worthy of respect as they are distinct persons
with goals and hopes such as ours. However, this respect of anothei2s
personhood cornes at a price. That price is a widespread mutual recognition
among contracting moral actors that needs to be earned.
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To earn respect as full .participants to Kant’s contract procedure,
individuals needed to display a willingness to justify their acts and to tame their
aforementioned interests. They can do this by pitting their interests against the
interests and the actions of the other contractors. The wiffingness to
compromise and to take each contractor’s interests at face value is only strategic
at best in Hobbes and forms no part of the contractor’s individual psychology for
him.
In Hobbes, the issue is one of satisfying the needs and desires of the
agents in the contract. it is neyer an issue for a Hobbesian ofjustifying beliefs or
desires to others. Each agent is a separate entity and is to 5e treated as such.
Hobbes view of man is instrumental in the pejorative sense of that term. For
contractarians of ail stripes, a social arrangement (or an ethical contract) is
legitimate only if the object of the agreement is the person who is subject to it. In
other words, persons are the final court of appeal in the social contract tradition.
This hypothetical contract is then the basis for a collectively enforced system of
cooperation among persons. Each person affected by the contract has reasons
for abiding by it. These reasons can be Hobbesian ones of mutual self-interest
and seif-preservation or Kantian reasons based on mutual recognition and
mutual respect. Contractors also have reasons for insuring that other
contractors, who are similarly situated, will abide by the social contract. This is a
second commonality among ail forms of contractarianism both old ones and
new ones.
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Scanlon’s contract however is more explicitly ‘thicaI’ than the “politicar contracts
of either Hobbes or Kant. The difference is that for Hobbes and Kant, issues of
coercion form the core concern occupying their fictive contractors.
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CHAPTER 2
It is the potentially coercive phenomena in social life that contractors
should be concerned to adjudicate, at least according to the classicai social
contract view. In Scanlon’s case, he believes that ail moral dilemmas relating to
what lie calis the morality of”right and wrong’ exhibit the same structure. The
structure is as follows: a failure to discern the contextual/practical features of
the dilemma, a failure to accord mutual respect appropriately, and a failure to
identify the key values at play for each of the moral actors embedded in the
dilemma. The political credentials of an ethical dilemma are of no import for
him.
‘Rightness and wrongnes’ are about the relations individuals occupy in
each other’s lives. As such, the nature of these relations forms the proper domain
of study for ethics. The most important elements in ethics to Scanlon are mutual
recognition and the establishment of a comprehensive and respectful account of
the status of persons. Unlike lis classical contemporaries (Hobbes and Kant)
Scanlon sees both a positive and a negative aspect to contracting. Negatively, the
classical contractarians used the contract device to fend off undue coercion. for
Scanlon, this negative application of the social contract is but haif the moral
story. The positive element of a social contract also requires attention. That
positive element is the creation of real social bonds, bonds that conjoin
contractors beyond narrow self-interests. Scanlon views social bonds such as
patriotism, local pride, professional courtesy, and others as instances of”positive
contracting’
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Friendship and promise keeping are also aspects of positive contracting. As an
amplification of ethics, politics fails within this ambit. Our responsibilities
toward each other are the same whether in political matters or in moral matters.
Unlike the older tradition of Kant and Hobbes, which was trying to
present a historical account of how citizens came to have the responsibilities
they had toward each other. Scanlon follows John Rawls in adopting a modem
view of how moral contracts function. For them, the device of the social contract
aims to answer the questions: ‘Why should I obey the law?’ ‘Why should I be
moral?’ ‘Why should the plight of others concern me?’ The contract acts as a
frame within which such questions can be asked and answered. The advantage
of the contractual framework is that it answers questions in a principled rather
than a contingent manner.
A difference between Rawis and Scanlon is that Rawis seems to view the
contract in question as a hypothetical matter. For Scanlon the contract is real in
a qualified sense. The issue separating the two is not whether citizens factually
agree to the idea of a social contract as it is presented. What binds Scanlon’s
account to Rawls’s, is the idea that if asked contemporary citizens would answer
in a way that is compatible with contractualist principles. This tacit reliance on
established practices and understandings gives Scan1ons work a practical focus
often lacking from other similar contractarian views. Therefore, the contract in
Scanlon is hypothetical in that it does not require empirical verification. It
trades on the intuition that most citizens can supply contract-like justifications
for the social cooperation they experience daily.
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Put differently, it is crucial for Scanlon that the individuals affected by the
contract device are aware of the benefits and burdens that such a contract makes
them party to and responsible for. The fact that most of find ourselves within
social systems that dole out burdens and benefits, and that we tacitlv agree to
the dictates of this arrangement, is empirical mooring enough for the
contractuallsm of Rawis and Scanlon. Therefore, the hypothetical aspects of the
contract are persuasive, because they accord with our everyday experience of
social life, while the contingent parts have sorne empirical basis.
The contract device is married to a constructivist conception of
legitimacy. Rav1s and Scanlon see the legitimacy of the contract device as a
function of its structure, and flot as a device rooted in sornething external to the
contract situation. Therefore, our social compact is legitimate because of the
reasons advanced in its defense. The contract is legitimate because the
agreement of which it is a product was itself arrived at by Jegitimate means and
for legitimate ends. For Hobbesians, the contract is simply a maller of
protecting and advancing the preexisting interests of the contractors. For Rawls
and Scanlon the idea is that through the negotiation of the contract we corne to
realize how we value what we value.
Drawing on preexisting values and commitments for contractarians of
Rawls’s type is tantamount to bargaining without allowing for the concerns of
other contractors. This cannot stand. For, the structure of legitimacy that the
social contract device exploits turns on evervone subject to the contract thinking
that it is in bis or her interest to obey it.
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If I know that my fellow contractors will not respect my interests and values,
then I have no real reason for contracting. If however, I am confident that we are
taking seriously and actively enforcing everyone’s respective interests and values
equally, then I have more reason to submit to the contract than I would
otherwise. Rawls works with this realistic aspect of the hypothetical contract.
Scanlon for his part sees the contract as actual and practical from the beginning.
He thinks the contract device portrays our actual reasoning and motivations for
submitting to the dictates of the social contract.
Contractualism as Scanlon understands it begins from the observation
that “we ail believe that some actions are morally wrong’ (Scanlon 2000 r).
Scanlon wishes to know what kind daim or judgment we are making in labeling
an action “wrong’ (Scanlon 2000 r). Where Scanlon breaks ranks with other
ethicists is in bis contention that ‘udgments about right and wrong cannot be
straightforwardly understood as factual daims about the empirical world or
about our own psycho1ogP (Scanlon 2000 r). The radical nature of this daim lies
in its upending of our traditional notion of right and wrong. for many
traditional moral theorists, particularly those of an orthodox utilitarian bent, an
act is wrong precisely in virtue of its empirical consequences. for traditional
deontologists, it is our psychological states and our duties to others that make
acts noteworthy or blameworthy. Contractualism rejects both explanations as
partial and therefore as unsatisfactory.
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This rejection is flot becatise empirical or psychological considerations do
not bear on moral decisions. Rather, it is because moral judgments are a factor
of the deliberations entertained by a single agent. If this is so, as Scanlon
contends it is, then psychological dispositions or empirical consequences are
importantly subordinate to reasons in moral decision-making. His rejection of
these traditional explanations is commonsensical. A moral agent can easily have
the right type of psychological disposition ta sympathetic disposition) and ail the
same arrive at the wrong judgment. Likewise, a moral act can have empirically
desirous consequences for one agent, while illegitimately disadvantaging
another agent (as instances of nepotism). One would be hard-pressed to
describe these arrangements as straightforwardly moral.
Other explanatory options of course exist. Rather than adopt the view
that no moral basis for judging acts exists (amoralism) or for a viewr that thinks
of moral judgments as essentially emotional expressions (emotivism) Scanlon
opts for another form of explanation. Against amoralism, Scanlon writes that
judgments about right and wrong “do seem to make daims about some subject
malter, daims which are capable of being true or falsd’ (Scanlon 2000 r). Against
emotivism, deontology, and utilitarianism, he notes that ‘while certain kinds of
experience can be important in putting us in a position to make moral
judgments, making these judgments themselves does not seem to be a matter
observation” (Scanlon 2000 r). In denying that psychological experiences are
necessary and sufficient for forming moral judgments, Scanlon downgrades
mainstream deontological daims of a certain type.
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In refusing to accept that moral judgments, are necessarily or sufficiently
a matter of empirical observation tout court, lie denies certain aspects of
mainstream utilitarian thought. Further, Scanlon states explicitly, that for him
‘We arrive at the judgment that a certain action would be wrong simply by
thinking about the question in the right way, sometimes through a process of
careful assessment that it is natural to eau a kind of reasoning’ (Scanlon 2000 1
[Empliasis added]).
By foregrounding the importance of reasoning about certain types of
moral judgments, Scanlon moves away from simple versions of emotivism. The
directness of Scanlon’s view stems from bis conviction that moral judgments are
like other forms of judgments in that alI judgments display the same logical
structure. Attempting to short-circuit some common misunderstandings of bis
account, Scanlon argues, “Moral judgments have the form of ordinary declarative
sentences and obey the usual laws of logic’And adds that”we should take these
judgments at face value, as making daims about their apparent subject matter,
right and wrong’ (Scanlon 2000 i). We should accept moral judgments at face
value for Scanlon because there is no special problem facing moral action. Ml
action for Scanlon is of the same type and exhibits the same structure upon
examination.
This view breaks with a view in contemporary philosophy that construes
moral action as special and as a problematic form of action. Against traditional
concerns with specifying the nature of moral acts, Scanlon simply offers the
following analysis.
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The respective traditions of Bentham and Kant mistakenly embroiled
themselves in metaphysical questions over the nature of moral judgment.
Metaphysics preoccupied these traditions with arcane questions concerning the
alleged relation between moral judgments and moral facts. Most of the issues
centered on the question of whether moral judgments correspond to moral facts
in some way, or whether moral judgments are simply descriptions.
While these metaphysical questions have a rich history of their own, they
are not part of contractualism’s purview. Much misunderstanding has arisen
from critics assuming that this swath of questions is Scanlon’s intended area of
study. It is not. ‘What drives me to look for characterization of the subject matier
of judgments right and wrong that goes beyond the trivial [problematic]
mentioned above, is flot a concern about the metaphysical reality of moral facts’
This is because Scanlon’s interest is purely methodological.
He wants to isolate a method by which we can adjudicate our reasons for acting
morally. A proper understanding of how we adjudicate these reasons can only be
had by recognizing the role that psychological and empirical factors play in
ethical reasoning at large.
As Scanlon explains, “if we could characterize the method of reasoning
through which we arrive at judgments of rights and wrong, and could explain
why there is good reason to give judgments arrived at in this way the kind of
importance that moral judgments are normally thought to have, then we would,
I believe, have given a sufficient answer to the question of the subject matter of
right and wrong as well.
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No interesting question would remain about the ontology of moral facts - for
example, about the metaphysical status of moral fact’ (Scanlon 2000 2). A key
feature of Scanlon’s account is his orientation toward the practical. By eschewing
the common strategy of grounding moral judgment on metaphysical daims
regarding the alleged connection between moral facts and moral norms, Scanlon
employs another avenue. He believes that we can ground our moral judgments
by appealing to the various reasons we, as moral agents, already entertain for
acting as we do in morally relevant situations. Scanlon denies the implicit
skepticism that informs much of ethical theory. He takes the sociological fact
that we do reason about our actions in distinctive ways as reason enough to
bother analyzing the class of reasons (reasons related to morally relevant action)
that we take to be binding in those situations.
He writes, “in contrast to everyday empirical judgments, scientific daims,
and religious beliefs that involve daims about the origin and control of the
universe, the point ofjudgments of right and wrong is not to make daims about
what the spatiotemporal world is like. The point of such judgments is, rather, a
practical one: they make daims about what we have reason to dU’ (Scanlon 2000
2). Contractualism’s viewpoint subsumes metaphysical issues to practical ones,
given that morally relevant circumstances typically involve calis to action of
various sorts. Scanlon specifles this commitment in stating that ‘hietaphysical
questions about the subject matter of judgments of right and wrong are
important only if answers to them are required to show how these judgments
can have this practical signiflcanc’ (Scanlon 2000 2).
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Thinking of ethics without this practical and agential component is
counterintuitive. What purchase would norms have on us, as moral agents, if
they did not commit us to act in some way? I am using the notion of an”actior’
expansively here. It is this intuition about moral action and others like it that
Scanlon uses in laying the groundwork for his contractualist ethic. Rejecting
metaphysically based skepticism about norms, the contractualist for Scanlon
need not affirm that ‘i metaphysical characterization of the subject matter of
morality’ is needed “to establish that moral judgments are about something ‘reaf’
(Scanlon 2000 2).
It seems that the opposite conclusion seems warranted. Metaphysical
questions of this ilk carry the burden of proof to contractualist eyes. This is
because they trade on the multiple meanings the word”realit’has. Since they do
not typically specify, “what kind of reality is at issue and why it is something we
should be worried abouf’ Scanlon argues for their sidelining (Scanlon 2000 2).
On the view Scanlon advances “it is enough to show that we have good
grounds for taking certain conclusions that actions are right or are wrong to be
correct, understood as conclusions about morality, and that we therefore have
good grounds for giving these conclusions the particular importance that we
normally attach to moral judgment’ (Scanlon 2000 3). The pragmatic element
informing his thinking is both persuasive and undeniable. Doubt for a
contractualist like Scanlon, requires as much epistemic justification as belief
does. One need not (therefore) privilege the moral skeptic from the outset.
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So far, we have however taken moral judgments to have a certain import.
Are we justified in this belief? This second challenge to the grounds of lis theory
is one that Scanlon takes more seriously than the first. His response to it, in
short form, is as follows. ‘The view I will defend takes judgments of right and
wrong to be daims about reasons - more specifically about the adequacy of
reasons for accepting or rejecting principles under certain condition’ (Scanlon
2000 3).
A common objection to this view is the charge that Scanlon is appealing
to “reasori’ without explaining wliat reasoning is supposed to be or what work
reasons are supposed to do. This criticism is unfair. Scanlon attempts to provide
an account of reason regarding his ethical theory, claiming that “as long,
therefore, as we have suitable ways of determining whether there would or
would flot be good reasons for rejecting a principle under the relevant
circumstances, and as long as we have reason to care about this result, a
characterization of judgments of right and wrong in terms of such reasons
provides a satisfactory account of the subject matter of these judgment’
(Scanlon 2000 3). Scanlon parses right and wrong similarly. He analyzes the
meaning of the terms “righf’ and “wrong,” dissects its methodology, and finally,
examines what lie calis its “reason-giving forcé’ (Scanlon 2000 3). Scanlon’s
analysis turns mostly on the question of what, if anything, gives moral reasons
(if such reasons exist) their probity and import. In Scanlon’s case, a version of
Rawls’s method of wide-reflective equilibrium serves as lis guiding method.
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In time, I will explain each of these terms of art and show how they
function in Scanlon’s view. For the moment, I will continue laying out Scanlon’s
project as he sees it. Actions, reasons and facts, interact in specific ways on
Scanlon’s view. The facts form a frame of reference. They allow the moral actor
to select possible courses of action.
As actions have consequences, some of which can affect the prospects of
others, our actions for Scanlon need to be constrained and structured by a
particular type of reasoning. What makes Scanlon’s view interesting is the
practicality and clarity with which he explicates what types of reasons moral
actors require and to whom they owe reasons of this type. He speils these
conditions out, most notably by explaining that I ask myself what reason
the fact that an action would be wrong provides me with not to do it, my answer
is that such an action would be one that I could not justify to others on grounds I
could expect them to accepf’ (Scanlon 2000 4). Scanlon then pinpoints the area
of morality with which his account concerns itself. Given that lie views morality
as a disparate field, this is a necessary step. Not everything we intend by the
term “moralit3P can aiways be adjudicated in the same way or by using the same
standards or measures. The complexity of eacli moral episode demands a
reevaluation. While our contractualist principles remain unchanged from
episode to episode and predicament to predicament, the concerns of others will
aiways for Scanlon temper our reactions and decisions concerning morals.
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“fus leads md’he writes’to describe the subject matter ofjudgments of right and
wrong by saying that they are judgments about what would 5e permilled by
principles that couM not reasonabiy be rejected, by people wlio were moved to
find principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly
motivated, could flot reasonably rejecf’ (Scanlon 2000 4).
An act is therefore considered wrong “if and only if any principle that
permifted it would be one that could reasonably be rejected by people with the
motivation just described’ (Scanion 2000 4). In other words, to be moral is to
want to reacli certain ends in certain ways. Attempting to abide by principles
that others, with whom you are attempting to agree, will find unacceptable is
pointless. Therefore, to the extent that parties to the moral contract that Scanlon
is discussing want true accord, the principles appealed to in negotiating riglit
actions from wrong ones need to 5e agreeable to ail involved. In this way, one
ailows for eveiyone’s interests equally, when this is wliat the circumstance
warrants. The practical purpose Scanlon wishes to achieve is well attained by
tying motivation and moral wrongness as lie does. This way, first-order moral
beliefs are of a piece with tlie psychologicai motivations that drive us (as moral
agents) to act as we do. Scanlon’s account would of course disallow any principle
tliat allows for the commission of nefarious acts, through the entertainment of
nefarious motivations or otherwise. Because lie sees motivation and action as
conceptually unifled, acts that bring harm to others witliout obvious benefits
(sucli as acts of wanton killing) are overruled by the reasonable rejectability
criterion that Scanlon has already establislied (Scanlon 2000 4).
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A benefit of adopting this unified conception of moral motivation and moral
action, is that “this description of the subject-mafter of our judgments of right
and wrong also lias the appropriate degree of independence from our current
first-order beliefs, since it leaves open the possibility that some of these beliefs
are mistaken and that the authority that we now attach to those beliefs in fact
belongs to others instead’ (Scanlon 2000 4).
What contractualism does is translate judgments of right and wrong into
what Scanlon takes to be notions that are more tractable. These successor
notions are judgments of reasonableness and judgments concerning epistemic
justification. So epistemic concerns come to frame concerns over what reasons
one has to act or refrain from acting in a certain way at a certain time. Rightness
and wrongness become translated as questions of context, motivation, and
reasonableness, thus rendering moral issues more clear-cut according to
Scanlon.”[Contractualism] describes judgments of right and wrong as judgments
about reasons and justification, judgments of a kind that can be correct or
incorrect and that we are capable of assessing through familiar forms of thought
that should not strike us as mysteriou’ (Scanlon 2000 4 [Brackets mineJ).
Scanlon’s appeal to “familiar forms of thoughf’ is echoed throughout What We
Owe to Each Other. His descriptions of these “familiar forms of thoughf’ ground
lis project in our everyday moral decisions. The widespread use of such
descriptions throughout lis works, serve to underpin my own thesis, which is
that Scanlon’s overriding concern is with justifying the practical aspects of his
contractualist program vis-à-vis everyday morality.
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Scanlon realizes that reasonable rejectability can be an attractive ideal,
even to those who think its appeal lies outside the immediate concerns of
Scanlonian theory. What is more, reasonable rejectability is intuitively
comprehensible. Unlike with complicated theories of motivation, moral agents
can intuitively understand why another agent, one who is concerned for their
own well-being, might reject a given course of action. The fact that some act is
wrong is morally prior for many individuals to its acceptability or rejectability by
others. Put differently, an act may be both rejectable and morally wrong, but its
factual nature gives us guidance. Scanlon’s view wants to overturn this seemingly
commonsensical staple of ethical thought. from the contractualist stance, we do
flot know what is riglit and wrong before reasoning about it. The
factual/commonsensical view faces this predicament according to Scanlon.
Commonsense telis us that society morally prohibits certain actions but it does
not aiways teli us why this is the case. A contractualist tack is one that analyzes
the action in question via a consideration of who could find the commission of
the act reasonably rejectable on moral grounds. It then analyzes the aspects of
the act itself, seeking to find what element(s) make the act acceptable or
rejectable. Only after this procedure lias taken place, can contractualism label a
given act morally wrong or right. Ail such attributions will be case dependent, at
least until there are enough similar cases from which to derive a principle that
allows or disallows their commission. Scanlons contractualism extends not just
to the nature ofvarious acts but to the motivations underlying them as well.
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Scanlon writes: “[Contractualism] holds that thinking about right and wrong is,
at the most basic level, thinking about what could be justified to others on
grounds that they, if appropriately motivated, could not reasonably rejecf’
(Scanlon 2000 5 [Brackets mine]).
For Scanlon the reasonable rejectability criterion”determines the shape of
more specific moral notions such as murder or betraya1’ It also explains whywe
have reason to avoid actions that could not be justffied in this way accounts for
the distinctive normative force of moral wrongnes’ (Scanlon 2000 5). The
motivational aspects of Scanlon’s view are what both separates it from solely self
interested versions of contractarianism (such as those inherited from Hobbes)
and what ties it to Kant’s deliberative version of the social contract. This
preference for Kant over Hobbes is not as controversial as it may initially
appear. There is no sense, on Scanlon’s view, of affempting to reason about
ethics with irrational people. An individual is irrational to the extent that they
see themselves as not bound by reasons they admit as valid. So too it is invalid
for two or more individuals seeking to agree to attempt to advance their own
respective advantage. What We Owe to Each Other is preoccupied with
providing a justification for the ethical motives underlying right and wrong
actions. ils first section, comprising chapters one through three, lays out
Scanlon’s account of practical reasoning. Here is a schematic presentation of that
account followed immediately afterwards by a detailed accounting of each
component idea (reasons, values, and well-being). Specifically, Scanlon presents
us with an account of how values and practical reasons intersect.
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This intersection is covered in bis discussion of the topic of well-being,
which contrary to utilitarian theory, Scanlon sees as but one value among others.
These flrst three chapters of section one is paramount because together they
form the bedrock of Scanlon’s contractualist account. Because Scanlon is neither
a strict deontologist nor a strict utilitarian, bis reinterpretation of value, well
being, and practical reason, carnes with it important implications for how he
interprets various aspects of morality.
I will attempt to clarify why Scanlon feels that reinterpretation is
necessary in this section. Scanlon’s account of practical reason is an account
based on reasons rather than on desires. Value is treated in chapter two of What
We Owe to Each Other where Scanlon defends his buck-passing account of
value against more standard teleological accounts. Finally, Scanlon sums the
resuits of chapter one and chapter two in the discussion of well-being that takes
pace in chapter three. For him, there is no non-moral conception of personal
weII-being on offer.
As such, ethicists should not rely on non-moral analyses of well-being
when discussing its structure. Scanlon denies that well-being can function as a
bridge between evaluative descriptions of people’s actions and non-evaluative
purely empirical descriptions. Scanlon insists on this because lie believes that
there is no non-question-begging way to defend appeals to non-moral factors
wlien discussing what motivates a moral agent to act as she does.
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Another factor animating $canlon’s analvsis of practical reasoning is his
deep dissatisfaction with the existing consequentialist and deontological
alternatives. Neither approach he thinks does justice to the pluralist nature of
morality. If desires are truly what motivates moral actors to act as they do then,
in Scanlon’s estimate, the only role left for moral theoiy is the promotion of
states of affairs that promote well-being and fulfihi the individual desires of
moral actors. This is a popular position that fie rejects as inattentive to the
vagaries of actual moral deliberation. If instrumental considerations best ftilfill
the desires of individuals then other forms of moral deliberation (non
instrumental considerations) wlll be shut out. This for contractualism is a
mistake, chiefly because desire does not and should not have the primacy that
consequentialists accord it. This is where values corne into play. If the
teleological view of value is true, as consequentialism takes to be, then the most
practical moral view is the one that promotes and amplifies well-being.
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CHAPTER3
The problem with this argument from the contractualist viewpoint is that
it occludes other (morally relevant) reasons from view artificially. $canlon
argues that consequentialists and utilitarians take value to be deductively
teleological. That is, they do not present any arguments to this effect.
Consequentialists and utilitarians for him presuppose this fact about moral
reasoning. This presupposition is one he rejects. On his view, deliberation from
an inductive stance is the only way to affirm or to deny the truth or falsity of the
teleological view of values. As well-being is obviously an important value,
teleological accounts are intuitively attractive. Scanlon recognizes this and
warns against it.
for him focusing on well-being alone leads one to think of
consequentialism and teleology as more attractive and more plausible than they
really are. Reasons do produce evaluatively relevant resuits and consequences
do matter signfficantly to Scanlon. However, lie objects to well-being being
considered the epicenter of moral deliberation, a commitment held by many
utilitarians. By including other reasons and other values, we get a different
picture of moral life and reasoning from the classical utilitarian one, or so
Scanlon argues below:
Succeeding in one’s main aims, insofar as these are rational, must be a component in
any plausible notion of well-being. But this idea serves as an evaluative Trojan horse, bringing
within the notion of well-being values that are not grounded in it. From an individual’s own
perspective, which takes his or her main goals as given, what matter are these goals and other
particular values, not the idea of well-being that they make-up. from a more abstract
perspective, taking these goals as not yet determined, we can say that a life goes better if the
person is more successful in achieving his or her main rational goals (whatever these may turn
out to be), but the conception of well-being that can be formulated at this level is too
indeterminate, and too abstract, to be of great weight (Scanlon 2000 132-3).
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We once again see the stress on commonsense rearing its head in these
comments. Scanlon must defeat utilitarianism to make bis account seem
plausible. This is because much of our everyday reasoning revolves around cost
benefit type analyses of benefits and burdens. In addition, while this type of
reasoning is undoubtedly moral (in at ieast one sense of the word) Scanlon
wants to say that it is not the whole story of how reason about what to do. I turn
now to the topic of reasons in contractualism.
A crucial feature of Scanlon’s view is bis distinction between reason
simpliciter and operative reason. For him, “ifiere is a difference between asking
what reason there is for believing that P and asking what a given person’s reason
for believing it was. (T will refer to the latter as the person’s operative reason)
(Scanlon 2000 19 [Italics in original]). Operative reasons are reasons individuais
already have and on which they act. Reasons simpliciter for Scanlon are reasons
upon which we deliberate and these reasons are structurally and logicaliy and
prior to the operative reasons we use when acting toward the achievement of
some particular goal. Stated differently, an operative reason is a guide toward
something we want whereas a reason simpliciter is a reflection on what renders
various available options attractive or unattractive to us as moral actors. While
we ail have dispositions that make us deliberate and act in certain habituai ways
we also have what Scanlon cails judgment sensitive attitudes, attitudes that give
us pause and force us to reflect on our very preferences before acting decisively.
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‘In order for a consideration to be an operative reason for me, I have to believe it.
In addition, I have to take it to be a reason for the attitude in question. There are
separate attitude’ (Scanlon 2000 56). This is part of Scanlon’s rejection of desire
as a central normative cum motivational notion in the ethics of action. Reasons
attach to attitudes for Scanlon but they are different from acts.
An action can be justifled only by appeal to deliberation and to a weighing
and counter-weighing of the attendant consequences of acting a certain way.
Otherwise, the moral actor in question is acting blindly if he only acts on his
desires and nothing more. This is the mutual respect and regard he owes to
those whom his actions would affect. This is a buck-passing view of value
because non-operative reasons are underlying the desire in question (whatever
it may be). These non-operative reasons actually make us act; at least this is so
according to the contractualist viewpoint. Thus, we value the composing
elements of an action, or the intended change brought to an unsatisfactory state
of affairs for Scanlon, but we certainly do flot act simply out of desire.
We do not only weigh the pros and cons of actions but also question
whether a given type of deliberation is itself fruitful; we cannot rest content with
the desire-based view of ethics that consequentialism brings. We do not simply
have reason about which we deliberate says Scanlon. We also deliberate about
which reasons should count within deliberation and over how they should count
or if they should sometimes count at ah. We include or exciude reasons, just as
we exciude or include facts from deliberative consideration, and this is done as
the dehiberative context warrants.
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What Scanlon provides, lie daims, is both a formai and a substantive
account of how we are to decide. Contractualism is a guide to figuring out what
should count when deliberating morally and what shouid not. The substantive
part of this view is Scanlon conviction tliat mutual respect for others matters
and matters aiways. The formai element is the demotion of desire-based models
of practical reason and their replacement with reason-based modeling.
In articles after What We Owe to Each Other Scanlon lias eased this
distinction between desires for acting and reasons for action. His current work
nevertlieiess retains a privileged place for practical reasoning and deliberation
that stands quite apart from the desire-based model. Next, I turn to Scanlon’s
account of values (chapter two). Consequentialists and utilitarians tend to value
states of affairs. He glosses their view in stating that: “as [moral] agents, our
relation to states of affairs lies in being able to realize them, to prevent them
from occurring, or to make their occurrence more or less likely. What we have
reason to do, on this [consequentialist] view (at least as far as questions of value
are concerned), is to act so as to realize those states of affairs that are best - that
is, have the greatest value. This teleological structure is often taken to be a
formal feature of the ideas of “goodnes’ or “valua’ rather than part of some
substantive view about which things are good ($canlon 2000 79-80).
So various facts, other than the fact that we want a given outcome,
determine what is substantively good for contractualist theory. The fact that a
given individual is found pleasant, trustworthy, or intelligent, will explain why
we act as we do toward that individual.
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No state of affairs intrudes here according to Scanlon. We respond to particular
substantive values and choose both how to deliberate about subsequent actions
on our part and about how to value the individual or object in question
appropriately. “Appropriate1’ here cornes to rnean with mutual recognition,
which works as Scanlon’s master value throughout What We Owe to Each Other.
Respect for rnutual recognition arnong sirnilarly situated and motivated
individuals acts as the theojs anchor. Value for contractualists is a double
sided notion.
As moral actors, we have cornpelling reasons for valuing the things we
value. We can value states of affairs, traits, objects of art, or people or things that
inspire us. When we so value objects, we use reasons, according to Scanlon that
are closely tied to the inherent values that are part of the person or object we are
evaluating. For ah these distinct (but related) ways of valuing something or
sorneone, Scanlon nevertheless rejects pure teleological accounts. While Scanlon
does not exclude states of affairs from value consideration, he does reject the
traditional teleological conception of prornoting the state(s) that yield the rnost
satisfaction or happiness. He explains that his: “Concern [...J is with the abstract
thesis that value has a teleological structure rather than with [...] other features
that teleological conceptions often share. Nevertheless, it is nonetheless
important to bear these other features in mmd, since the appeal of particular
teleological views, and their distinctness from methodological alternatives, often
depends upon them.
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Indeed, one may wonder whether, once it is recognized that a teleological
conception of value can assign intrinsic value to actions as well as to their
consequences, and that this value need not be impartial or additive, there is any
content left to the bear idea of a teleological structurÇ’ (Scanlon 2000 81 [Ellipsis
and italics mine]). At bottom, Scanlon is trying to provide a unitary description
of what renders wrong action “wrong.” He is not interested in morality at large.
Rather, he is spurned by the desire to respect projects of individual moral agents
as well as respecting collective endeavors of a type that require mutual respect
(and mutual recognition) on the part of moral actors.
It is imperative that we distinguish the central issues in Scanlon from
ancillary concerns raised by What We Owe to Each Other. The book both
advances two distinct frameworks. One is a substantive theory, particularly
displayed by chapters four and five. These chapters deal with what a
contractualist morality requires of moral agents in terms of their actions.
However, the book also allempts to answer ancillary issues of moral motivation
and of epistemic methodology. These are more formal, less morally substantive,
issues in general philosophy. Scanlon’s tacit commitments in these areas (moral
psychology and epistemology) are partially explicated in bis endorsement of
wide reflective equilibrium and Kantianism.
While these general concerns are important issues in their own right,
Scanlon is far from conclusive when it comes to formulating his own
philosophical commitments toward these. It would therefore be beyond this
thesis’s scope to attempt a comprehensive presentation of the said issues.
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Instead, I concentrate on the issues that Scanlon treats directly, issues such as
reason, value, and well-being, found in his first three chapters. At issue is
whetlier he successfully connects these observations from the early part of the
book with his the doctrine he later endorses (in chapters four and five).
Reason in contractualism is a “primitive’ notion. Scanlon treats it 50
because he thinks no beller explanation of the function of reason exists. A
reason is something tliat counts in favor of an act or of an appraisal. The act or
appraisal is itself evaluated based on the component elements providing its
make-up and/or by the consequences for mutual recognition that its
commission or its non-commission would entail. Therefore, in this, and despite
his protests, Scanlon is a commonsensical consequentialist about reasons as
these affect the relation of mutuai recognition and respect lie believes ail morally
wortliwhule episodes between individuals sliould exhibit. This relation of respect
and of recognition extends to nonliuman objects as well, such as ailworks, and
to more complex relations, like those involving distinct social roles.
Professions, such as teaching, law, medicine, and others, display virtues
of this type (virtues such as acting professionally or listening attentively)
according to Scanlon. This observation lielps clarify why Scanlon thinks lie can
make due with a spartan notion of reason. What is innovative in his treatment of
reason is lis refusal to provide overt restrictions upon wliat can and cannot
count as a valid moral reason. This is because mutual recognition among
contracting agents serves as an inbuilt corrective to any wayward reasoning
brought into tlie contract by either party.
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This is partially to show the resilience behind the idea of mutual recognition and
to display Scanlon’s skepticism about the possibility of providing context-less
criteria for reasoning.
While actions require reasons, the converse is not aiways true. This is
another point brought out by Scanlon’s unwillingness to commit to a single
constrictive notion of practical reason. As actual moral deliberation neyer
exhibits a unitary structure, Scanlon finds it misleading to advance a
simpleminded account of moral reason. Considerations for Scanlon come in
positive and negative varieties and he sees no reason why practical deliberations
about norms should be any different. These practical concerns determine
whether an action is right or wrong. No ftirther more muscular notion of reason
is required according to him.
The attempt to provide such muscular accounts does flot erroneously
assimilate concrete and particular considerations that people may have to an
abstract notion of”reason’This for Scanlon is needless. We do better to attend to
the existing considerations that actual individuals in actual situations entertain.
A reason, for Scanlon, is a desire or a psychological disposition toward a given
outcome or state of affairs. Employing a pragmatic criterion, Scanlon thinks of
reasons as considerations. Considerations do the actual work in moral reasoning
in lis view. The difference between careful moral deliberation and carelessness
is one of degree and not one of kind. In Scanlon’s estimate, people commit moral
errors when their reasoning is either too narrow, too general, or off the mark in
some other way.
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Contra bis critics, he does not believe that moral errors are the resuit of having a
faulty comprehension of what “reasori’ requires. Scanlon takes it that no such
requirements exist (in the abstract).
Ail that is relevant to quotidian deliberation, moral or other, is that the
affected agent takes careful consideration to deliberate about ail the relevant
factors before committing to acting in a certain way. Nothing, for Scanlon, is
gained by invoking reason or constraints on reason. The moral agent who
deliberates well, and does so as a matter of habit, will continue to make the right
moral decisions regardless of his ascription or agnosticism regarding the nature
of practical reason. Practical reason is “practical’ speciflcally in that it relies
heavily on convention and on prior experience. It uses only evidence that is
present to hand. What practical reason does not rely on is a metaphysically or
epistemically thick notion of reasoning.
In order to know whether a moral agent is acting morally or not Scanlon
applies a double-faceted test. First, he asks if impacted individuals can
reasonably reject the outcome at hand. Secondly, he asks if the proposed act
exhibits a reciprocal form of respect for those affected by its consequences. This
second facet is general enough in scope to include the damage done to
impersonal entities (such as the environment) and thus evades the charge that
contractualism is pejoratively anthropocentric. Scanlon’s view of reason is lean
but it is not as meager as some critics, like Onora GNeill, have suggested.
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His primitive conception of reason allows him to “make judgments
drauring whatever distinctions there are between those considerations that are
(good) reasons for action and those that are nof’ (Scanlon 123 2004). Scanlon
does not doubt that rational criteria can be mustered for distinguishing between
which reasons are relevant when. Rather, lie doubts “whether it is possible to
state general criteria from which these [distinguishing] judgments (let alone ail
valid judgments about reasons for action) follow (Scanlon 123 2004 [Brackets
mine)).
Scanlon can eschew general criteria for distinguishing which reasons are
reasons for action and which are not. This is so because lis contractualism
already employs a built-in distinction between operative reasons and standard
reasons. Mlowing for the possibility of error, Scanlon does not take an agenfs
‘bperative reasor’ to be authoritative. The reasons that agents take to be good
ones for acting in some way, may not actually be the best (objective) reasons
avaiiable to them. Contractuaiism does not rule out ail possibilities for error, nor
is it designed to. It does however present moral agents with a test of whether
their actions are in fact defensible or flot.
Just because a moral agent prefers a given act and therefore proceeds
with its performance does not render that act right. If the act is acceptable by ail
affected by its commission, and if said commission does flot directly conflict
with the mutual recognition criterion, then an act can be said to be defensible.
Therefore, whule Scanlon’s definition of”reason” is intentionaliy ieft primitive, the
vork it enabies moral philosophy to do is not primitive.
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Contractualism can robustly favor or disfavor an act without requiring
Scanlon to provide a full account of what practical reason requires in ail
potential cases. To explain why agents act as they do, moral philosophers have
often appealed to three notions: reason, motivation, and desire. According to
Scanlon, while desire and motivation have been the most attractive of the three
options he finds this favoritism misguided. What We Owe to Each Other can be
read as an assault on the very idea that desire and motivation should
(respectively) figure as the central notions that underpin any plausible
normative ethic.
The very idea of a”desir’ is shown by contractualism to be littie more than
a motivational state like any other, thus loosing its special motivational status.
Just because I have desires does not mean I act on them. Just because I act in a
certain way does not mean I intend or desire ail the consequences of my actions.
Reasons intercede at every turn. Moreover, this is exactly Scanlon’s point. I can
act on the wrong reasons without being irrational. Moral agents make mistakes
because they are not omniscient, and not as some orthodox Kantians and others
have it, just because of irrationality. Actual moral practice, Scanlon’s touchstone,
shows this latent rationalism to 5e empirically mistaken.
In addition, motivation Scanlon alleges is “an unstable combination of a
purely psychological idea (a state that causes an action) and a normative one ta
consideration that makes action rationalj’ (Scanlon 124 2004). Features and not
desires are what actually make moral agents act as they do. The features of the
desired object (or of an expected outcome) propel one into action.
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Desires are mere corollaries of these features on the contractualist view. This
insight is the basis of $canlon’s rejection of the desire-based model of moral
motivation.
If the outcomes of our actions, or the features of desired objects, were
altered so as to remove the attractive feature or consequence from the mix, it is
highly unlikely that we would act as intended. This of course presupposes that in
acting a certain way we (as moral agents) wish to increase its overail presence.
Classical utilitarian theory advances that we should aiways act to produce as
much value as possible through our acts or to maximize various states of affairs
as these contribute to well-being. If Scanlon is right then the allractiveness of
this simple picture is greatly diminished. It is not that we should be indifferent
to valuable objects or states of affairs. It is rather that by contractualist lights,
you cannot know what is valuable or beneficial to your well-being before
deliberating about it. To think this is to fail back into a pernicious rationalism.
Scanlon concedes that desire may play a role in determining how one act,
but such determination only arises as far as an individual’s operative reasons are
concerned and they neyer function alone but always in concert with features that
the agent takes to be worthwhile and attractive. It is unfortunate that Scanlon
employs the terms”desir’ and”motivatior’ as their common meanings in English
do not display the pernicious effects he carefully enumerates. “Desird’ in common
speech is a term of degree. It is also an expressive term signaling approval or
disapproval to other speakers.
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The psychological cum normative view that Scanlon takes issue with is not as
apparent in everyday usage and lack of transparency masks the practical side of
his project.
Much the same situation afflicts the word “motivation’ A”motivatior’ can
be any feature of the environment that spurs an organism into action. It need
not carry the pernicious associations Scanlon detects in “desire’ Nevertheless, as
these are lis terms, I am commitled to using them as well. These misgivings
aside, his points against creeping rationalism, remain convincing. Tt is a mistake
to ignore the fact that, ‘When I desire to go indoors because it is cold outside, my
reason for going in is my discomfort (and the fact that going in will relieve it) flot
the fact that this is what I desire (Scanlon 124 2004).
Desires have a role to play but Scanlon is correct to counsel against
overstating their motivational case. The same holds true of operative reasons
and other genres of undhecked motivation. The form of social contract that
Scanlon outiines in What We Owe to Each Other is peculiar in that an actual
agreement among individuals plays no explicit role in justifying the theory. Only
agreement on standards of conduct is required. His view is based on both
constructivist and contractarian principles. A constructivist theory is one based
on a given conception of reason. With this conception, one can figure out what
reason would require one to do or refrain from doing.
As we have seen, Scanlon provides only a primitive theoiy of reason and
this on purpose. Therefore, while lis views exhibit some constructivist
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attributes, it is not a full-blown form of moral constructivism. Individuals within
the contractualist framework have reasons for agreeing to certain principles, but
they do not need to subscribe to a particular definition of reason to attain
reasonable resuits. What we have in Scanlon is a theory of mutual recognition
and a sketch of what mutual respect entails, morally speaking. We do not have a
substantive normative theory based on the dictates of reason alone. This would
be to abandon the practice of reason-giving for the faulty picture of reasoning
displayed by moral rationallsm. Scanlon’s theory not only combines modifled
contractarianism with partial constructivism, but it also combines some
hypothetical contracting with some actual contracting.
As Scanlon indicates, ‘What people do, as a maLler of fact, agree to (like
what individuals have, as a matter of fact, consented to) can be morafly relevant
in certain cases. But neither actual agreement or actual consent plays a
ftindamental role in morality as I describe it (Scanlon 125 2004). A central
notion in contractualism, in addition to the notion of mutual recognition, is that
of well-being. The failure of consequentialist theories inspired by classical
utilitarianism for Scanlon is that they can only make sense of an agent’s moral
life from two mutually opposed viewpoints: The private and the public. This is
not because the private and the public are distinct moral reaims. According to
Scanlon, consequentialist theories are misadvised because they do flot accord
mutual respect its rightful primacy in moral deliberation.
By extending mutual respect to each individual, we display recognition of
each individuaïs personhood. This matters on the contractualist view because if
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the well-being of individuals is overestimated then our ability to construct
acceptable political theories will be compromised. If individual preference
satisfaction is our metric then we cannot reconcile the desires of each individual
with needs and responsibilities of a society. Classical hedonistic utilitarianism
and some versions of contemporary consequentialism make exactly this mistake
for Scanlon. On the other side, if one adopts an impersonal utilitarianism on the
model of Bentham, then the individual interests of some can be sacrificed to the
interests of the many. This too has dire consequences.
For Scanlon cautions, allowing numbers to dictate what is morally
permissible or impermissible leads to a devaluation of each individual’s
personliood. Moreover, part of each individuaTs well-being is bound up in a
common respect for bis or her person. This series of tradeoifs is seen as
unacceptable to Scanlon. In their stead, lie proposes bis conception of mutual
recognition. By respecting and holding each individuaTs person to be as valuable
as any other is we can both construct a normative theory focused on personal
well-being as well as found a political philosophy that provides acceptable
standards of conduct for social life. A key problem with the weight traditional
utilitarian theory puts on the notion of well-being is the utilitarian’s insistence
that the notion is clearly demarcated. Scanlon disagrees. Comprehensive well
being requires many variegated components. Desire satisfaction is only one.
Chef of these components is the satisfaction of various teleological aims
and the fulfiliment of personal projects. However, as Scanlon notes, ons aims
need to be both rational and reasonable. Achieving irrational ends will not
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increase a person’s well-being. Further, unlike hedonistic utilitarianism, one way
of promoting or achieving well-being may be through altruism. A parent can aid
a child through some sacrifice on the parent’s part.
This sacrifice is woilhwhile for the parent because it accentuates or
advances other aims that a parent might have (such as seeing one’s child succeed
in life). As straightforward as this is, Scanlon is nevertheless cautious about
endorsing well-being as a master value to be promoted. His misgivings are
chiefly due to uncertainty. He writes, “But while success in these aims [aims that
increase well-being] makes one’s life better, there is no clear answer to the
question of how much it does sd’ (Scanlon 125 2004). It is the task of generating
a theoiy capable of encompassing private and public aspects of our moral lives
that animates at this stage contractualism. Intuitions, some of which we may
have before deliberating about what morality requires and about what others are
owed, have littie normative bearing for Scanlon. These are simply issues outside
the ambit of a methodologically serious moral theory. Pre-moral notions of well
being also do flot count. The aspects of each individuaïs life that Scanlon has
selected for scrutiny are for him the most relevant ones, ethicafly speaking. He
does not deny that others exist. Rather he denies that their inclusion or their
analysis will yield great resuits. Once each person’s willingness to see her life go
well has been taken into account, little remains for moral theory to do.
Once deliberation shows that the respect and recognition we want for
ourselves is also owed to others in equal measure, littie remains to bicker about.
Or so Scanlon wants to convince his readers. He concedes that perhaps: “An
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adequate measure needs to reflect more fully the degree to which a person is
successful in achieving bis or lier main aims. If so, however, the question to be
answered in devising an alternative is tlie moral question of liow just social
institutions must aid individuals in the pursuit of their aims, not tlie pre-moral
question of tlie degree to whicli success is an aim (in providing for one’s chuldren,
for example) contributes to person’s own well-being’ (Scanlon 125 2004). An
obvious problem for Scanlon is that part of bis theory can be inverted. Scanlon
daims that evaluative properties can usually be explained via recourse to some
reason. Nevertheless, he has already indicated that reasons are primitive in part,
as they always point to some property outside tliemselves. Any act I find
appealing to perform will be attractive in virtue of some property it has. We can
cali sucli properties ‘valuative propertie’ as they influence and guide our
evaluation of them.
Now, Scanlon wants to daim that it is not tlie propeily alone that makes
me want to act toward its promotion or achievement. (‘Promotioi’ here should
not be taken to imply aggregation as in classical utilitarianism). It is also, lie
daims, the reasons for so acting tliat in fact make me act when I do and as I do.
Whule intelligible, this maneuver seems arbitrary. It would be simpler to drop
the primitive notion of reason and instead daim that we act in accordance with
tlie properties we detect in state of affairs or in objects.
Tliere seems no easy solution to this quandary for Scanlon because in
morality most of the properties people will act on will be properties that bave
evaluative import. Joseph Raz levels a similar criticism toward Scanlon.
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Scanlon’s response is that while, “Raz may think this [use of evaluative
properties] is always possible because a reason (at least a reason for action,
which is the kind under discussion) can always be explained by citing the
evaluative property on which it is based. I, on the other hand, believe that
evaluative properties often need to be explained by citing reasons. For example,
the daim that something is good is made intelligible by citing the properties,
often non-evaluative ones, that give us reason to pursue it, promote it, or
whatevei’(Scanlon 127 2004).
There is a difference between claiming that evaluative properties are
always implicated in moral reasoning and Raz’s daim that contractualism is
vacuous because “its test yields results only by presupposing moral views which
can only be established independently of if’ (Scanlon 12$ 2004). I side with
Scanlon on this question but against bis idea that reasons trump evaluative
properties. Scanlon can defeat Raz’s second objection by claiming that it is not
‘moral view’ that contractualism presupposes, but rather intuitions. Ail moral
theories appeal to some intuitive pre-theoretical judgments. What
contractualism does (pace Raz) is to interpret these pre-theoretical intuitions
through the key notion ofjustiflability to others. That is not a vacuous test, as a
person’s intuitions can be altered via novel interpretation.
So long as a similarly situated individual could find those interpretations
legitimate, Scanlon is in bis rights to daim that he bas avoided contradiction.
What is problematic is that Scanlon cannot provide a standard capable of
assessing the relative strength that various reasons can have for obtaining from
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within his view. He can only reject, or insist that given reasons be kept in mmd,
by other similarly situated contractors. There is no mechanism for making fine
grained and relative evaluations in the whole of Scanlon’s contractualism. In
addition, this I think counts against its best quallty, namely contractualism’s
(otherwise) practical merits. His view is intuitively plausible in a way that
utilitarianism and deontology may not be.
However, it is also vague in a manner that consequentialism (which
should be distinguished from utilitarianism) is not. Consequentialism can
account for the relative strength of various actions and principles. If a proposed
principle or action will have worse consequences overali, it is rejected. If the
consequences are good on the whole then the principle or action is to be lauded.
An entire calculus of the relative strength of various actions and principles can
be erected. I do not see how contractualism as Scanlon presently presents it can
do the same. Scanlon is aware of this shortcoming but instead views it as a
recommending feature of his theory. He takes it that its quietism on relative
strength type questions is a symbol of its inherent flexibility. I do flot see how
relative-strength type questions can be eluded in this way.
for in determining which grounds we as moral agents have for either
accepting or rejecting an act, a course of action, or a set of principles, we need to
know the relative benefits and burdens of these acts and principles. There seems
no easy way out of this lacuna for Scanlon. Scanlon tries to answer this lingering
concern by allowing for more than one interpretation of contractualism and by
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noting that harms in the face of small aggregative gains (for example) are
prohibited on lis view. This however does not answer the worry. In moral
deliberation, there are often small tradeoffs that are significant and that yet
cause no harm and provide only some with benefit. The problem is that
equalizing these out or simply not providing a metric for adjudicating between
them seems wrong.
Often these smail tradeoifs are the deciding factors in our actions. An
exampie of this is the choice of which career to engage in or which major to
pursue in university. The choice between majoring in sociology or phulosophy
may evince a “sma1lei’ lifestyle gap than the choice to become a dentist rather
than a stunt pilot, but it is for ail this a serious choice for the one contemplating
it nonetheiess. This is because whule these are not choices about aggregation in
the typical utilitarian sense. They do contribute to one’s well-being (at least in
the long term) and for this reason, they cannot be set aside. No direct harm
cornes from dhoosing one profession over the other, but if the stunt pilot option
disallows one from studying the aspects of social life that one finds the most
intriguing (say that this is 50 because of a iack of time) tIen a ios’ of a sort has
surely occurred. Contractualisrn does not address such lacunas effectively.
Scanlon sees this type of potential problem and writes, ‘That conclusions
that appear to flow from a natural way of understanding reasonable rejectability
conflict with clear moral intuition’ (Scanlon 129 2004). The problem is that so
far no answer has been forthcorning save for some oc! hoc solutions. The closest
Scanlon cornes to providing some guideline toward correcting his oversight is to
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offer a partial response. Scanlon responds that if”an action of a certain type can
be avoided only at significant cost to the agent and, if performed once, will
impose trivial costs on each of a large number of people. But if actions of this
type are performed frequently, the costs to each of these others add up and
become very significant—greater (for each victim) than the cost (to each agent) of
avoidance. In such cases, it seems clear to me that permissibility of the action
depends on whether a restraining principle is needed—ffiat is to say, on whether
there is good reason to believe that, in the absence of some principle of restraint,
such actions will be widely performed’ (Scanlon 132 2004).
This partial response misses the point of the criticism. it is flot that
repeated commission of the act will harm others. It is that even small rarely
performed acts can have lasting consequences. Others need not be harmed or
disadvantages by the types of acts in question. The issue is flot one of harming
some for the small benefit of others. It is rather an issue of small divergences in
choice resulting in (potentially) life-altering outcomes for the agent making the
choice. T do not want Scanlon to eradicate contingency from moral deliberation.
Nevertheless, an account of the relative strength of various choices and
outcomes is owed.
Otherwise, mutual respect and recognition is acting as a master-value beyond
other values. This poses a problem for Scanlon daims repeatedly in What We
Owe to Each Other to be a pluralist about value. This privileging of mutual
recognition over all else seems to land Scanlon in some type of malformed
consequentialist position.
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The relative strength of reasons play a dominant role in interpersonal
justification. Scanlon agrees that this is the case and goes as far as to say that
this problem, “is most naturally understood within the context of a view that
makes conclusions about riglit and wrong depend on the relative strength of the
reasons that individuals can offer in the process of interpersonal justiflcatior’
(Scanlon 133 2004). In this quote, the view in question is his contractualism. Yet
littie is explained and even less is clarified by Scanlon’s granting of the “relative
strength’ problematic.
The issue remains and either “reasonable rejectabilit)7’ or ‘hiutual
recognitior’ requires modification in order to deal with it. Neither notion can be
overhauled without the basic tenets of Scanlonian contractualism being
drastically altered. Scanlon is reluctant to make this move toward correction
because lie sees”morality [as] drained of its special significance if it is taken to be
simply about the relative strength of the reasons that there are. It is important,
in order to account for the special significance of moral conclusions, to recognize
that what is at stake are the reasons we can offer one another in a process of
mutual justificatior’ (Scanlon 133 2004).
Whule this is true, mutual justification and mutual recognition cannot
trump the relative strength that various reasons have. The best one can do, it
seems, is to spilce an account of mutual justification like that found in Scanlons
contractualisrn with the abilitv to rank the relative strength of various reasons
and outcomes as found in consequentialism. In treating normative notions as on
a par witli natural kind terms, Scanlon has made a mistake. His analogv between
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them is imperfect and ieads to probiems like the one above. Whule Scanion bas
acknowledged this, his refusai to provide an alternate conception of his project,
one that does not concern itself with “moral propertie’ as if these were on au
fours with “naturai properties,” takes away from the eminently practical thrust
that contractualism lias as an account of moral motivation.
At best, the focus on”moral propertie’is a distraction; at worst, it leads to
severe, if unnecessary, conceptual muddles. If the”propertie’ analogy is dropped,
the contractualist project will go more smoothly. It shouid instead be replaced
by two distinct projects. One project is the explication of the idea that
contractualism is (first most) a method for adjudicating competing
interpersonal moral daims. This flrst project can be supplemented by a second
project, one that seeks, at a substantively normative level, to offer an
interpretation of what mutual respect for ail moral agents looks like. Anything
short of this, does not, and cannot work. The advantage of the consequentialist
theories that Scanlon hopes to best, is that they are internally coherent, in a way
that contractualism is flot yet.
Perhaps it will reach such coherence in the future. If it does, it will only
do so on the strength of recognizing the pervasive and irreducible role that
consequences play in moral reasoning. The appendix below demonstrates how
Scanlon applies his theory to concrete case. The case is that of the military
dïctatorship that rule Argentina. The aim is the reformulation of retributivism
and the advancement of a consensual theory of punishment. Here Scanlon
focuses on consequences more so than in What We Owe to Each Other. He also
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shows, by picking the Argentine context, how heavily piuralisrn eighs on his
mmd. The probiematic element of the Argentine case is that of accomodating
the viewpoints of ail the moral players to the drama. A society cannot demand
justice at any social cost, but nor can it ignore justice compieteiy.
APPENDIX: SCANLON ON PUNISHMENT
In “Punishment and the rule of iaw’ T. M. Scanlon pursues a llne of
inquiry initiated in the work of Carios Nino. The work of both Nino and Scaniôn,
consists in the task of’building a legai order that preserves the rule of iaw and
provides remedies for victims of past hurnan rights abuse’ (Scanion 219 2003).
The link between the two cornes from an article of Nino’s. Nino subrnitted an
article to Philosophy and Public Affairs, which Scanion was the associate editor
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of. Ninds “A Consensual Theory of Punishment,” forwards the view that cour1
imposed criminal penalties, should avoid appeals to retributivism. for Nino,
systematic penalties cannot be justified on grounds of deterrence, deterrence
being the prime justification for retributivism.
Scanlon, who is in general agreement with Nino, notices that the
bracketing of retribution has unintended practical consequences. To discuss
punishment productively for Scanlon, we need two things: first, a theoretical
justification for punisliment, and second, an institutional limit on its
application. Once this distinction is made, between the justification for
punishing and the limits of its application, we can turn to the practical
challenges. Scanlon detects four such challenges. I will go through these in turn.
It bears keeping in mmd that these are practical limits thought flot necessarily
conceptuaï limits. The first practical limit is a prohibition on retroactive
punishment. A comprehensive account of punishment, cannot allow for
unlimited retroactive punishment. Such an allowance would be impractical.
It could also create a culture of rampant litigation, one that could undermine the
legal order we are trying to repair. The second practical limit bears on the state
of mmd of the offender. This requirement is crucial, as it affects what can count
as the precondition oflegal guilt; more on this later (Scanlon 219 2003).
The third limit is a limitation on selective punishment. This limit is self
explanatory. No legal regime can arbitrarily punish some offenders, and not
others, while retaining its daim to legitimacy. For Nino, the third limit was
paramount. He detected a great failing in retributivism at just this point.
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Retributivism on bis view, requires the punishment of”all of those believed guilty
of given offenc’ (Scanlon 220 2003 [Original italics]). Practically, this
retributive requirement reduces the role that judges can play in meting ouf
punishment. If deterrence is the goal, as if is often assumed to be by advocates of
retribution, then everyone must be punished if found guilty of an offence. Other
views of punishment, according to Scanlon and Nino, leave room for political
interventions. Political interventions or suspensions of punishment may be
requisite in certain situations. Genocides, juntas, and other “abnormal’ political
occurrences may force judiciaries to find alternative forms of punishment. Often
this is the case where punishment of an entire subset of a society, its military for
example, may 5e detrirnental to social order. The fourth, and Iast, practical limit
to theoretical reflection on punishment, concerns the status of victims. When
someone is victimized, bis or lier daim to legal response undergoes Iwo
processes. The daim is flrst interpreted and then it is either legitimated or else
rejected.
What Scanlon wants to show is that each of these limits is analyzable into
(specific) moral reasons. He wants to show that ethical concepts underpin
political concepts in a specific way. I turn to this discussion next.
Scanlon defines retribution “as an account of the rationale for legal
punishmenf’ (Scanlon 220 2003). It is a two-part notion. Part one argues that
the commission of a moral wrong should be met by a loss of some sort. Part two
argues that punishment bous down into a relation between desert and welfare.
The role of legal institutions for the retributivist is to make these two parts
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coincide into one. Therefore, if you harm someone, your welfare should be
degraded. If your welfare is degraded, the perpetrator “merit’ a punisliment.
Retributive theory seeks to make these concepts (i.e., desert and ment) inter
translatable. Retributive punishment is an extra-institutional form of
punishment. Its basis rests on victims liaving been morally mistreated.
Whiie institutions can mistreat people, the retributive model is
standardiy not geared toward addressing such violations. This is a tricky idea,
but its force lies in decoupling criminal law (which is an institution) from moral
wrong (which is a moral notion). The criminal law for Scanlon lias one
justification, namely social order. While retributivism, with which criminal iaw
is often associated, exemplifies another justification. Retribution works on
moral, flot institutional grounds. Scanlon, inspired by Nino, rejects
retributivism. He does so because it is premised on faulty reasoning. It is simpiy
not the case that moral desert should entail suifering. It desert can entail loss,
but it need flot entail suifering. There is simply no conceptual necessity here.
Moreover, even if we want criminals to suifer for their crimes, suifering for
Scanlon is no basis for a political institution. Institutions like courts, aim to be
deliberative bodies. The enforcement of law is to be principled, not mereiy
brutal. We do not need courts to enforce brutality.
Wliat makes Scanlon’s interpretation of Nino interesting is lis concession
tliat while retributivism is institutionaily weak, something like the retributive
view is hard to avoid (on a moral level). We do not after ail want to aliow
criminals to act witliout punishment. In thinking of Argentina’s militaiy junta
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(1976-1983) Nino vas struck by how attractive retributive thinking was. Scanlon
too wonders if we can fuily negate its value in extreme situations such as these.
Why should retroactive punisliment not obtain? Why should the junta’s
kidnappers and torturers not 5e punished? Should ail such acts not be
punished? Is this type of retribution not justified in the eyes of the victims
(Scanlon 221 2003)? Perhaps the attractive feature of punishment is not
i’etribution itself but rather deterrence. Deterrence addresses past injustice by
attempting to prevent future injustices. This seems a more plausible basis for
establishing criminal justice than by retribution does. Surely, we want to
discourage more crime. Less crime seems better, even if getting it means
sacrificing some retribution.
As Scanlon says, “the deterrence account appeals to the need, first, for a
general practice of punishing human rights offenders [as in the junta case] even
if their actions were allowed by the legal and political order in place at the time
they were committed, and then, second, to the justffiability of punishment in
particular cases as something that must be required by any such systeni’
(Scanlon 221 2003 [Brackets mine]).
However, Scanlon detects a problem with the notion of a purely
deterrence-based account of punishment. Noticing a theme originally raised by
Joel Feinberg, Scanlon advances that affirmation of the victim’s position is left to
one side with pure deterrence. Returning to the case of the junta in Argentina,
Scanlon notices that there is a tension between law and extra-institutional
morality. The generals responsible for the junta argued that their actions were
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moral because iaw allowed them. The victims argued that despite the letter of
the law the actions of the generals were immoral. There is a sense in which the
victims of Argentina’s military dictatorship are clearly right. Law cannot legisiate
immorality. Yet it appears as if of ail the avaiiable theories of punishment, only
retributivism gives full weight and affirmation to the voice ofthe victims.
How can this be so? Can the rights of victims be asserted outside of a
retributive framework? Questions of this nature, questions that pick apart the
roots of differing concepts, form the core of what philosophical theory can
accept to accompiish in practical arenas. Affirmation, Scanlon believes, can
perhaps do some of the work that retribution is often miscredited with doing.
for in the case of the junta, it is flot that the generals were not made to suffer
that displeased the victims. Rather, it xvas the fact that their acts were flot even
seen as criminal after the trials.
rFIere was no stigmatization and no shame associated with the immoral acts
perpetrated by the dictators. Yet the victims had been stigmatized and shamed
by these same actions.
Scanlon explains his amendment as follows. ‘Like retribution, affirmation
is an aim that responds to the past and is addressed in the first instance to each
particular case. Nevertheless, it also provides a reason for having a system in
which particular daims to be wronged can be recognized and given a form in
which they can be publicly expressed and responded to. Having such a system is
also relevant to the aim of deterrence, understood in a generai sense of
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discouraging future crime, rather than the narrower sense of doing this by
threatening retaliatioi’(Scanlon 223 2003).
If the law does not represent right and wrong in a manner that is
accessible to those it serves, they will have littie stake and hence littie interest in
it. A eau for affirmation as a central political and ethical value may make a first
step toward shoring-up the rule of law. From an institutional perspective, public
hearings are a provision with just this sort of reasoning in mmd. There are many
forms of punishment. Not eveiy crime or transgression needs to be met with the
same mode of punishment.
A tension exists in Scanlon’s account however. He wishes to advance
fairness as another value that is crucial to a weil functioning practice of
punishment. Yet fairness, as Scanlon notices, seems to require that ail similar
crimes be punished simiiariy. On the other hand, he sees the political value of
occasionaily allowing some crimes to go unpunished.
Stated differently, there are political cases where a different kind of
sanction may serve the greater interest of ail and such cases, Scanion reminds
us, may require amendments to fairness. This is an example of what Scanion
means by the idea that morality underpins politics. We must be careful flot to
allow deterrence to become mere expediency. For Nino as weil as for Scanion,
the answer lies in a consensual theory of punishment, one that cornes with limits
on the application of punisliment buiit-in. A consensual theory is one that states
the foiiowing. ‘Those who commit crimes thereby consent to the normative
consequences of their action’ (Scanion 226 2003).
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Legal contracts function much like this. By entering into a contract, you
forfeit certain freedoms and gain new 011es. This loss of one freedom for another
would flot occur had you not consented to the contract. The same mechanism is
at work in consensualism. The basic assumption of sucli a view of punishment is
that the consequences of certain actions be known, and this to aIl in a public
fashion. One the consequences are known individuals can enter or fail to enter
into various”contracts’
The advantage of consent as a master value is that it can accommodate
both political and moral contexts. It can do so without contradiction and can do
so at both an individual and a collective level of application. How you act, in
other words, defines what you can demand. This edict, it appears, can serve as
the ground of a therny of punishment that is not at odds with itself, or with its
institutional embodiments. What more can one ask legitimately ask for.
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